gradually replace the traditional bus system during a 20-year period. What is problematic, however, is that the traditional bus system is laden with negative incentives and problems that will most likely impede Transmilenio from covering the entire city let alone advance beyond its looming third stage. Worse still, these negative incentives translate into low-quality service, bus oversupply, and paradoxically high fares for most riders. This paper analyzes Bogotá's current public transportation situation to draw lessons for the successful planning of bus rapid transit (BRT) systems in Bogotá and in other cities. To carry out this research, secondary sources were consulted and representatives of the bus companies, bus owners, and government officials were interviewed.
Bogotá, Colombia, is internationally known for recent innovations in public transportation, namely, the Transmilenio bus rapid transit system. Transmilenio carries close to 1.3 million trips per day, or 20% of bus trips in the city, on an 84-km network. Transmilenio's original plan called for implementing a system that covered the entire city, replacing the previous bus system. However, the institutional arrangement for service provision in the traditional bus system is plagued with negative incentives that lead to poor-quality service, oversupply of buses, and inflated fares. In addition, the government agency in charge of controlling the traditional bus system is weak and lacks the authority to carry out the required policies. The result is a pervasive oversupply of buses despite Transmilenio's efforts to reduce it and powerful vested interests that have organized against the project. As a result, the analysis suggests that Transmilenio's original plan faces obstacles that can hamper the implementation of future stages because of the problems in the traditional mode. This paper analyzes Bogotá's current public transportation situation and seeks to draw lessons for cities in developing countries, particularly Latin America, that try to replicate Bogotá's reforms. Although the paper does not question Transmilenio's success, it does raise issues that need to be addressed to make bus rapid transit planning and public transit reform more effective.
Many cities in the developing world, particularly in Latin America, need to reform their bus-based public transit systems to improve the quality of their systems or to retain or increase ridership (1) . Cities such as Curitiba, Brazil; Quito, Ecuador; and Bogotá, Colombia, offer successful examples to follow (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) . Bogotá implemented the Transmilenio bus rapid transit system, which was designed to replace the city's traditional bus system gradually. The latter uses U.S.-schooltype buses and offers low-quality service and lengthy rides-the average trip is 90 min (6). The Transmilenio system uses exclusive busways, high-capacity articulated buses, and other technologies to offer high-quality service. Transmilenio is without a doubt successful (5) . For example, it moves close to 1.3 million trips per day on 84 km of busways. Bus operations are private and quite profitable. User satisfaction is reasonably high (7). Despite Transmilenio's success, the traditional bus system still remains on most of Bogotá's streets and transports approximately 80% of transit demand (8) . As such, this fact is not a problem because the original Transmilenio project plans called for the new system to little responsibility in this regard. The arrangement induces bus owners to compete in the streets against other buses, operate their buses continuously, disregarding fluctuations in demand throughout the day leading to a waste of resources (2, 10, 11) .
Bus companies maximize their profits by luring investors to purchase as many buses as possible-regardless of what actual passenger demand dictates. STT, in turn, is not strong enough and suffers from endemic corruption, and so bus companies introduce new buses easily. The result is a pervasive oversupply of buses on Bogotá's streets, which increases congestion and reduces the quality of service, except in regard to frequency (8, 9) . By 2005 the city had 20,500 buses in total, excluding buses in the Transmilenio system, and different studies estimate that the traditional system could operate with 13,000 buses (8, 12) . Further, in 1999 the 16,500 buses on active service on 10 Transportation Research Record 2038 a given day carried 5 million trips per day. By 2005 the number of trips per day had dropped to 3.9 million, but the number of buses on active service remained at 16,500. Buses are old-average age is older than 15 years-and many buses are unsafe (8) . However, as the number of buses increases, the gross revenue of bus owners decreases and with it profitability. To counter this decrease, bus companies mobilized to convince the Ministry of Transportation to establish a formula for setting the fare that automatically increased the fare as the number of passengers per bus per unit of time decreased (13) . As the number of buses increases, the number of passengers per bus per unit of time decreases. Therefore, the fare automatically goes up. By law, the fare has to be estimated for each type of bus every 6 months. This approach increased the fare above its true cost (Table 1 ) and transferred the cost of the oversupply of buses to the users.
For instance, by 1980 a regular bus-capacity of 80 passengersmobilized 680 passengers per day (ppd). By 1991 this figure had gone down to 460, and by 1999 to 330 ppd. By 2004 a regular bus mobilized only 250 ppd (8) . The international standard is about 1,000 and at least 800 ppd (14) . At the same time, fares increased in real terms to compensate for the lower ridership per bus. Table 1 shows the increases in fares in real terms-above inflation-by type of bus. Because old buses have higher costs, their fares increase faster, up to 199.6% above inflation in 10 years (9, 12) . Clearly, the user carries the burden of the inefficient arrangement. The city government tried in 2001 to abandon this formula to set the fare, but the courts ruled against it because it contradicted the formula set by the ministry, as explained below.
Finally, bus operators face an incentive to compete for each and every potential passenger standing on the curbside; as a result driving habits are poor. Locally this competition is known as the "penny war," and economic theory dubs it "competition in the market" (1). Bus drivers literally fight for each prospective passenger. Boarding and getting off the bus becomes dangerous as the driver stops for a very short amount of time. The penny war also motivates drivers to disregard schedules and to stop anywhere a prospective passenger stands. In their attempt to win the competition, drivers block other buses and race against them, hence spreading the lack of safety (8) . In sum, the traditional bus system operates under competition "in" the market, which leads to an excessive supply of buses, well above the number required to satisfy demand, extreme competition for each passenger, inflated fares, and low-quality service. 
OBJECTIVES AND RESULTS

OF TRANSMILENIO PROJECT
Enrique Peñalosa was elected mayor of Bogotá for a 3-year term running between January 1, 1998, and December 31, 2000. Peñalosa had studied the city's transportation problem and concluded that the root of the problem was the institutional structure, namely, the competition in the market. He therefore conceived, with the help of a wide number of consultants and experts, a bus rapid transit project named Transmilenio under the tenets of competition "for" the market (2) . In a competition for the market for service provision, operators compete for the right to operate a route or a number of buses. Once in service, however, the government offers the operators protection from onstreet competition in the form of barriers to entry to the market [see World Bank (1)]. Transmilenio therefore operates under Colombia's mass transit legislation, which allows competition for the market and is different from the legal framework for the traditional mode. The city government through Transmilenio Co., the manager of the system (Figure 2 ), issues competitive bids to determine which operators will operate a number of buses under a concession agreement. This concession is for a limited period of time-instead of the "for life" approach of the permits in the traditional mode. Further, fares are calculated under a system approach-to cover cost for operators, fare collectors, and Transmilenio Co. (15, 16) instead of just the costs per bus of the traditional mode. Finally, Transmilenio operators are contractually protected from competition from the traditional mode in the corridors in which they operate.
On the physical side, the Transmilenio system uses segregated busways to allow buses to travel at higher speeds without interfering with mixed traffic. Passengers pay on entering the station and board at the same height as the bus. These measures ease passenger movements and reduce bus maneuvering time (17 ) and prevent competitors from operating in the Transmilenio corridors. The first stage of the project had three busways, chosen because of their high ridership, with a total of 42 km. Stage II of the project covers another 42 km (2) .
The city council created Transmilenio Co. in 1999 with the possibility of paying higher salaries than STT, because Colombian law allows higher salaries for state-owned enterprises than for other government agencies. This allows Transmilenio Co. to hire better-trained professionals. In 2000 Transmilenio Co. issued terms of reference, and four bidders won the right to operate 470 buses for Stage I of the project. The bidders are new bus companies that own the bus fleet and operate it under the close supervision of Transmilenio Co. (Figure 2 ), which plans routes, frequencies, and schedules. Because operators win the right to operate buses, and not routes as in the traditional system, Transmilenio can easily change route design and schedules (2) . These changes created new bus companies that do not have an incentive to increase the number of buses in the streets, but instead to respect the number set in the contract, which Transmilenio Co. enforces.
Transmilenio Co. pays its concessionaires per distance logged by their buses and not per passenger transported. Using a GPS system and a team of inspectors, Transmilenio Co. supervises the operators to determine whether they stop at the stations and supply the scheduled service. Transmilenio eliminated the "penny war" in its corridors. In short, the Transmilenio BRT project implied changing from competition in the market to competition for the market. The result is a world-class BRT system.
AFTER TRANSMILENIO
Changes brought about by the Transmilenio BRT system eliminated all the negative incentives of the traditional bus system. But this change was only in the corridors in which Transmilenio built segregated busways-a total of 84 km of more than 1,000 km used by the traditional system (18). Yet Transmilenio is able to efficiently move close to 20% of the city's transit demand (8) . In addition, Transmilenio Co. recognized the problem posed by the oversupply of buses in the traditional mode. To reduce the oversupply, Transmilenio Co. requires its concessionaires to purchase and scrap a number of traditional buses for each new articulated bus and feeder bus that operates for Transmilenio. In Transmilenio's first stage this number was 2.7 traditional buses for every new articulated bus. For the second stage it was 5.5. This increase recognized that each Transmilenio bus was equivalent to more than 2.7 buses, because each bus moved approximately 1,400 passengers per day, instead of the 250 of the traditional bus. Close to 3,500 traditional buses were removed from the streets and scrapped thanks to this measure.
Unfortunately, the net effect on the total number of non-Transmilenio buses was minimal-the net reduction in the oversupply was about 500 buses instead of 3,500-and oversupply continues to be a problem. One reason for this effect is that at the same time that Transmilenio concessionaires scrapped traditional buses, the bus companies in the traditional system replaced them with newer buses. Bus companies needed to maneuver in this way to keep their gross income intact for as shown they derive revenue from buses affiliated and not from passengers transported. Strictly speaking, however, the bus companies were not supposed to replace the buses, but STT's weakness allowed it to happen. As a result of the pervasive oversupply, seeing empty buses on the streets is common even during peak periods and ridership per bus continues to decrease (12) . In contrast, Transmilenio buses operate close to capacity and the system carries more than 1.3 millions trips per day on a relatively small network leading to a productivity of 1,300 passengers per bus per day (by December 2005).
FAILED ATTEMPT TO CHANGE TRADITIONAL BUS SYSTEM
In 2000 Peñalosa left office-there is no immediate reelection of mayors in Colombia-with high approval ratings (17) . Transmilenio became an internationally recognized success (3) (4) (5) 15) . The next administration, headed by Antanas Mockus, continued the Transmilenio project by planning and beginning to implement its second stage. In parallel, members of the Mockus administration headed by Claudia Vasquez, secretary of transportation, were concerned about the traditional bus system. For them, Transmilenio's first stage serviced less than 10% of the demand. Further, Transmilenio would be able to extend its network at a very slow pace. For one, the city could not afford the required investments. For another, the costs of construction of the second stage were higher than for the first stage mostly because of the need to provide additional capacity for cars as required by STT. If Transmilenio could not offer its high-quality service soon, the majority of users would have to continue using the low-quality, problem-laden traditional system. Vasquez and her team planned wide reforms that included changing the way fares are calculated and building facilities to ease bus flow. Vasquez faced increased opposition, including opposition from Peñalosa, and had to resign 1 year before Mockus's term in office expired. Her successor, Javier Hernández, enacted the reform, without the infrastructure element.
The reform of the traditional bus systems included four far-reaching elements. First, STT changed the way fares are calculated so that they would not increase automatically as the oversupply increased, thus seeking a supply that better matched the demand. Second, the reform sought to change the flow of money between bus companies and bus owners in the non-Transmilenio system. As stated earlier, the existing arrangement is that bus owners pay rent to the bus companies for the right to operate on the companies' routes. The reform wanted the bus companies to rent the buses from the bus owners. Bus companies would then become responsible for actual service provision and for operating and maintaining the buses. Bus owners would receive a payment from the bus company at the end of the month.
Third, the reform wanted bus companies to be responsible for collecting bus fares. Fare box collection by the bus companies makes sense when they are in charge of actual service provision, as the reform intended. These two elements together sought to eliminate the incentives that promote the oversupply of buses. First, it would no longer be in the interest of bus companies to "affiliate" as many buses as possible. Second, bus companies would not be interested in demanding fare increases to cover an excessive number of buses in the streets. Bus companies would try to match their bus fleet to meet the actual demand, hence reducing the oversupply. And the intended reform would also benefit bus owners, who would become capital investors instead of service providers.
The fourth element of the reform directly targeted the oversupply by ordering a 29% reduction of the total non-Transmilenio bus fleet. This reduction is equivalent to more than 5,000 buses. According to Colombian law, STT had to follow a complex process to reduce each company's number of buses. However, the net reduction has been less that 5% of that goal. Further, to finance this reduction, the reform established a trust fund in which part of the fare box had to be allocated. Bus companies collect these funds from the bus owners. Yet the companies do not deposit the funds in the trust fund because they believe the funds are "safer in their hands than in the trust fund," according to sources interviewed. This has become a contentious issue between the city government and the bus companies that has led to open conflict.
Although some bus companies have adopted elements of these reforms-changing the contractual relationship with bus owners, collecting bus fares directly, and reducing the number of buses in the streets-most companies have continued to operate in the old way. And a series of bus companies even determined a way to continue to add buses despite a cap the city set on the total number of medallions.
Finally, some bus companies and bus owners filed lawsuits questioning the legality and constitutionality of the reform and have won in the courts. At the time of this writing, all four elements of the reform were declared illegal by the courts, but appeals are in progress. The courts argued that STT did not have the authority to carry out these reforms because they violated national regulation. Instead, the Ministry of Transport had this authority. A clear example is the court's argument for declaring that the city's attempt to change the fare calculation formula is illegal: only the ministry's fare formula is valid.
In sum, the reform attempted by the Mockus administration was well intended and far reaching. Yet it achieved little. Why? One reason for the failure lies in the incentives in the traditional bus system. As seen, traditional bus companies maximize profits by introducing as many buses as possible and this incentive dominates the actions of most bus companies-although a few are changing in positive ways. The other reason for failure lies in the lack of authority and the weakness of the city government, topics that will now be addressed.
LACK OF AUTHORITY
Colombia is organized as a centralized republic in which the national government is in principle responsible for most public affairs. The government has slowly decentralized some functions to municipal governments. Yet in public transportation, the decentralization process has been particularly drawn out. Although the national government has assigned municipal governments the responsibility for managing public transportation, it has given them little authority understood as space for action or room to maneuver. An example of this is the way that fares are set, in which the only tool is a nationwide formula that promotes oversupply. Bogotá's attempt to change the formula resulted, as mentioned, in lawsuits from bus companies and in court rulings against STT. The courts used similar arguments to declare the other reforms illegal by stating that only the ministry could alter the farecalculation formula and enact all other reforms. This left Bogotá and STT without the authority to enact changes. Put differently, the national government assigned the responsibility to Bogotá of handling its public transportation, but did not give the city the tools to carry out that responsibility.
WEAKNESS OF CITY GOVERNMENT
Another reason underlying the failure of the Mockus reform of the non-Transmilenio bus system is the weakness of the city agency in charge of the non-Transmilenio system, the STT. STT is a particularly weak agency; it does not have the technical capacity required to adequately regulate and supervise the traditional bus companies (12, 19) . The reforms implied not only enacting the decrees, which STT did, but also enacting a series of measures to guarantee success. Specifically, although the decrees ordered a gross reduction in the number of buses in the city, STT had to reduce the allowed number of buses for each bus company. This part entailed carrying out demand studies for each route in each company, recalculating the bus fleet for reach route, and determining the resulting specific reductions for each company. STT was unable to carry out these tasks, as the rulings by the courts show. Consequently, there is a power imbalance in favor of the bus companies, which easily continue to add buses to an already crowded field.
Contrast this situation with the Transmilenio BRT system. Transmilenio Co. has highly qualified people and other resources that turn it into a capable agency. Transmilenio Co. plans daily service in a highly complex system. The Transmilenio operations are complex because they involve 1,018 articulated buses, 410 feeder buses, more than 60 different routes, and demands of up to 45,000 passengers per hour per direction at some points (20). This complexity also demands highly capable operators who are able to operate and maintain large fleets of modern buses and manage large numbers of personnel. Despite their capacity, the Transmilenio operators do not have more power than Transmilenio Co. There is a power balance that allows win-win solutions to problems, and that for the most part eliminates rent seeking.
In sum, because of the weakness of STT coupled with the lack of space for action, the city government has not been able to enact effective policies that adequately address the root problems in the traditional mode. This situation can hurt the future stages of the Transmilenio project.
IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANSMILENIO
In Bogotá there are two schools of thought concerning implications of the traditional bus system problems for the evolution of the Transmilenio system. The first argues that Transmilenio will be able to gradually overtake the traditional bus system. This position also states that the number of traditional buses scrapped for every new Transmilenio bus can rise but probably not above eight or 10 traditional buses per articulated bus. Proponents argue that Transmilenio Co. might still be able to lure investors under these conditions. The second school of thought, in contrast, argues that the current political economy of the traditional bus system can hurt Transmilenio's expansion plans and even prevent them from being carried out. The author argues that this latter scenario is more likely.
A first key reason is that the incentives in the traditional system are too strong and convenient for many vested interests. Although some good, traditional bus companies are changing for the better, most are not. Second, STT enacted reforms but was unable to enforce them because of its weakness and lack of authority. The new Secretariat of Mobility (SM), which replaced STT, faces the same situation because its origin lies in the national government. The bus companies that resist change are aware of these weaknesses and continue to play their game-incorporate buses owned by someone else and make profits from renting out routes. Third, and related, even if Transmilenio advances as planned, given the strength of the incentives and the weakness of SM, traditional companies might continue to add buses at the same time that Transmilenio scraps them-as has happened since Transmilenio's inception. This behavior means that the rate of scrapped traditional buses per new Transmilenio bus will continuously increase over time but it will never effectively reduce the oversupply, hence increasing costs.
Finally, and critical, the Transmilenio and non-Transmilenio services are competing modes. Transmilenio competes by offering a better service than the non-Transmilenio system. The fare element becomes critical in this competition (21) . Lleras (21) found that cross elasticity is high: "A 1% increase in the Transmilenio fare would produce a drop of 0.67% in the probability of choosing this mode and an increase of 1.54% in the probability of choosing the competing mode. However, an increase of 1% in the fare of the traditional system would produce a 0.40% drop in the probability of choosing it and an increase of 0.17% in the probability of selecting Transmilenio." Therefore, Transmilenio's fare cannot exceed by much the fare of the traditional bus system. Transmilenio Co. initially opted for a fare that is marginally above the highest fare in the traditional system probably in an attempt to maximize demand and hence revenue (see Table 1 ). Notice, however, that Transmilenio's fare covers total system costs, that is, costs of trunk buses, feeder buses, fare collection, trust fund, and Transmilenio Co. The fare for the traditional buses covers only the costs of each bus, thus showing how BRT increases bus efficiency.
The question is, How long can Transmilenio maintain this fare policy? Several key reasons suggest that the answer may be, not for a long time. First, the Colombian government wants to reduce the subsidies it gives to fuel in light of higher international prices. With the fare established in a contract between the operators and Transmilenio Co., an increase in the price of fuel will eventually mean a fare increase. But because the government wants to begin reducing the subsidy first to large consumers, such as Transmilenio, the traditional system will not experience an increase in the prices of its fuel because each bus is considered a small consumer. Second, it is likely that to attract investors for subsequent stages, Transmilenio will have to set a higher fare because the corridors that remain to be taken over by Transmilenio are the least profitable ones owing to lower passenger demand. In light of increasing investment cost per bus used in Transmilenio-mostly because of higher scrapping rates-a fare increase is the way to maintain a reasonable return on the investment.
But Transmilenio cannot increase its fare without experiencing lower demand given the high cross elasticity. The incentive therefore is for Transmilenio to ask SM, as the fare-setting authority in the city, to boost the fare for the traditional service as well. This will protect Transmilenio's interests to a point. But it will be heaven for the traditional operators who resist change, seeking fare increases to keep traditional buses profitable despite low ridership resulting from the oversupply. The opposite path, increasing only Transmilenio's fare, also benefits the traditional mode given the high cross elasticity. Indeed, in September 2006 Transmilenio followed this path by increasing its fare to 1,300 pesos. At the same time the city kept the traditional mode fares constant given a conflict between the city administration and the bus companies. The result is that an estimated 100,000 riders are taking the traditional buses and not Transmilenio. Indeed, although Transmilenio carries 1.3 million trips per day, it should be carrying close to 1.45 million, according to demand estimates.
Once again, the incentives embedded in the traditional system come to the fore together with the weakness of SM. Traditional bus companies resistant to change might look at the political economy and see they can keep adding buses because the odds favor them and not the extension of Transmilenio. Hence in regard to its future stages, Transmilenio finds itself between a rock and a hard place. Increasing the fare hurts only Transmilenio; yet increasing the fare might be unavoidable.
CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS
Implementation of Stages I and II of the Transmilenio BRT system has enjoyed political support. Further, the project has been financially sound because Transmilenio concessionaires recover all costsincluding the costs of scrapping old buses in an effort to reduce the oversupply-and enjoy a good return. Moreover, the fare is about U.S.50¢ and Transmilenio has no special subsidy, other than the diesel fuel subsidy, which the traditional system also receives. More important, Transmilenio appears to be a success also from the point of view of users, who continue to patronize it.
Unfortunately, the future of the next Transmilenio stages does not appear to be very bright because of the institutional arrangements of the traditional, non-Transmilenio bus system. These arrangements motivate traditional bus companies to incorporate as many buses as possible-owned by other investors-thus generating oversupply and a low-quality and expensive service. Coupled with this incentive is the weakness of STT (or SM). SM can enact well-intended, far-reaching reforms, but lacks the institutional capacity and the room to maneuver to implement and enforce the new rules. Traditional bus companies, moreover, know how to fight in court to protect their trade. Transmilenio Co. might therefore need to increase its fare to cope with oil prices and to attract future investors in light of increasing scrapping rates. Yet increasing the fare puts Transmilenio in a difficult position in which the likely outcome is lobbying for increases to the traditional bus fare. This increase closes the vicious circle: a high fare perpetuates the oversupply of buses that Transmilenio seeks to eliminate.
In light of the analysis, there are three lessons for other cities planning to emulate Bogotá's reforms. First, a Transmilenio-like BRT system is an excellent start for reforming the public transport sector because it brings about much needed change in the quality of service. Further, a BRT system demands a high level of institutional development to work properly; therefore the project catalyzes the construction of much-needed institutional capacity.
Second, despite the successful outcome in the BRT corridors, other reforms might be needed in the traditional system, either in parallel or after the first BRT stages open for service. Indeed, existing institutional arrangements can be loaded with negative incentives that can later haunt the evolution of the BRT system. Other policies can help. The main one emerging from the case of Bogotá is to strengthen the agency in charge of the traditional bus system or to use the institutional capacity brought about by the BRT project to help supervise the traditional system. A strong government agency regulating and overseeing the traditional bus system will be able to enact realistic reforms and implement them.
The third lesson is that reform should also include changes to the negative incentives of the traditional bus system. For example, in Bogotá's conditions it is possible to propose that the city government-through a fiduciary agent-collect the fares for the traditional system (see Figure 3) . Currently, it is the bus drivers who collect the fares and pass the money on to bus owners on a daily basis, and they in turn pay the bus company a rent on the route once per month. With centralized fare collection, the city collects the fare and pays bus companies, which in turn pay bus owners. The "penny war" ceases to exist, provided there is a strong city agency that supervises the system and plans service provision. In the case of Bogotá this agency has to be Transmilenio Co. because it has the expertise and the technological tools required for service planning in a complex route system. Without this supervising agency, centralizing fare collection does not produce the expected results.
In this regard, Curitiba (Brazil) offers an example. In the mid-1980s the city successfully centralized fare collection-without resorting to any high-technology measures. The city pays operators per kilometer logged, and a highly capable agency, URBS, plans and supervises service provision (2) . This suggests that the proposed reform for Bogotá is feasible. Except that in Curitiba, bus companies do own the buses, contrary to the situation in Bogotá-a feature more common in the developing world. In these conditions, the city should probably pay the bus companies according to the number of passengers carried by the bus fleet affiliated to that company. This measure erases the incentive for bus companies to continuously add buses to their stock. Instead, companies want to reduce the number of buses because it is the way to maximize profits. Bus companies, in turn, will pay bus owners according to distance logged by each bus. Because payments will be, for example, twice per month, all buses will log the same number of kilometers, even if they were undergoing maintenance and could not operate for 1 or 2 days during the period between payments. With payment per kilometer logged, bus owners do not have the incentive to operate en masse during the off peak, but in accordance to actual demand. Bus owners will see an increase in their return on the investment, support the reform, and agree to reduce the oversupply. But once again, for the centralized collection to work as planned, strong supervision is needed. In the case of Bogotá that should be in the hands of Transmilenio Co., which already has the required capacity for service planning and supervision. Indeed, Bogotá's new Mobility Master Plan calls for reforms along those lines, including strengthening SM, enlarging Transmilenio's role, and centralizing fare collection, among others (8) .
In sum, the reform of public transportation systems in cities in developing countries should begin with the implementation of a BRT system because it brings about positive change in service quality and builds institutional capacity. In parallel or soon after, however, reform has to include enacting policies that target the negative incentives and improve government supervision of the traditional and not-yetreformed bus system. And therein rests the strength of beginning reform with a BRT system: the additional institutional capacity can serve for this purpose.
